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ARGUMENT 
In its Brief, Provo City argues that "[wjithout such broad extraterritorial powers 
municipalities would often be precluded from providing even the most basic public utilities 
such as water, electricity, sewer, solid waste disposal, and airports because those amenities 
are often located in remote areas beyond the city boundaries. See Br. of Appellee at 27. This 
is simply not true. Article XI, § 5(b) expressly grants eminent domain power "within or 
without the corporate limits" to municipalities exclusively for the provision of "local public 
utilities" and "local public services." 
This case involves the protection of individual property rights from a sovereign's 
abuse of power. To protect these individual property rights, Article XI, § 5(c) of the Utah 
Constitution limits municipal eminent domain power to "make local improvements" to 
property "within the corporate limits." 
Even a casual observer of local government expansion over the last two decades is 
well aware that governmental entities under the claim of the "public good" and through 
confiscatory planning and zoning have caused a major erosion of private property rights. 
While the courts have been loathe to substitute judicial decision for legislative policy and 
decision making, the case now before the court is not a policy making determination by the 
city council, but is an interpretation of rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
The parameters of the Constitution are not without limitation. The Court cannot read 
it in such a manner as to render meaningless other sections. The encroachment of 
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government becomes oppressive when private rights must consistently yield to the will of 
government. In this case, the city not only wants to impose its will on its own citizens, but 
now upon those who are not part of the municipality. 
Provo City seeks to condemn Spring Canyon's property, which is located outside the 
boundaries of the municipality, to construct a road. The road's primary purpose is to 
alleviate the congestion problem of a particular locality. As such, it represents a local public 
improvement and Article XI, § 5(c) prohibits Provo City from taking the land outside its 
boundaries by eminent domain. 
I. PROVO CITY DOES NOT HAVE EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDEMNATION 
POWERS TO CONSTRUCT A PUBLIC STREET BECAUSE SUCH POWER 
HAS NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY GRANTED TO PROVO CITY. 
The general rule is that the powers of a municipal corporation are limited by its 
boundaries and cannot be exercised outside them. See 2A McQuillin on Mun. Corps. § 10.07 
(3rd Ed.) (1996). As such, a municipality cannot condemn land located outside its corporate 
limits unless that power has been expressly delegated to the municipality by the state 
legislature or the state constitution. See 4 McQuillin on Mun. Corps. § 1495 (1921). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Utah has stated that "[t]he power of eminent domain is 
not to be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and the courts possess full authority to 
determine the proper limits of the power to prevent abuses in its exercise." CP Nat. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Common of Utah, 638 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981); see also Salt Lake County 
v. Ramoselli. 567 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1977). 
2 
Furthermore, because the power of eminent domain involves one of the attributes of 
sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of abuse and injustice, "any fair, reasonable, 
substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the 
corporation [city], and the power denied/' Salt Lake City v. Revene. 124 P.2d 537,540,101 
Utah 504, 510 (1942) (quoting 1 Dillon on Mun. Corps., §237 (5th Ed.)); see also. 26 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 18 (1966). Consequently, under existing Utah law, "[t]he right 
of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has 
been strictly construed by the courts so that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the use 
and enjoyment of his property." Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950) 
(emphasis added). Thus, as a rule, a municipal corporation cannot condemn property beyond 
its limits, unless authority to do so is expressly given. See generally, Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d 
at 628; Mack v. Town of Craig, 191 P. 101 (Colo. 1920); See 4 McOuillin on Mun. Corps. 
§ 1495 (1921). 
Cities or municipalities have no inherent or original legislative power. See Nance v. 
Mayflower Tavern, 150 P.2d 773, 774, 106 Utah 517 (1944). To determine whether a 
municipality has the power to exercise any particular power, the Court must look to the 
legislative grant of power and to the Utah Constitution. Id. If reasonable doubt exists 
concerning the existence of a particular power, "that doubt should be resolved against the 
city, and the power should be denied." Id. 
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To prove the existence of the extraterritorial condemnation power to construct a road, 
Provo City relies on a laundry list of unrelated statutory provisions. Those provisions, 
however, fail to expressly or implicitly grant Provo City the right of extraterritorial 
condemnation to construct a public street. Provo City claims that "it is futile to argue that 
a municipality cannot directly act . . . and acquire by extraterritorial condemnation property 
. . . when it could indirectly acquire those same easements extraterritorially." Br. of Appellee, 
at 21. Provo City bases this conclusion on the fact that a municipality may enact zoning 
regulations for "limited development in transportation corridors" and such zoning regulations 
may be part of a comprehensive plan that includes areas "outside of the boundaries of the 
municipality."Br. of Appellee, at 19-21 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-302(a)(b) and 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-403. Provo City relies on these provisions to imply that even 
though the power of extraterritorial domain has not expressly been delegated to the city, the 
city may possibly be able to acquire property located outside its boundaries under some 
circumstances. Thus, according to Provo City's Brief, the Court should allow the city to 
acquire Spring Canyon's property by extraterritorial eminent domain. 
Provo City, however, ignores the fact that this Court does not favor the extension of 
the powers of a city by implication. See State Tax Comm'n. v. Bd. of Com'rs of Salt Lake 
City, 261 P.2d 961, 964, 1 Utah 2d 60 (1953). As such, because municipalities have no 
inherent powers, the power of extraterritorial eminent domain must be expressly granted. 
See Dairy Product Servs. Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 589 (Utah 2000). 
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Additionally, Provo City's use of statutory provisions that do not expressly grant 
extraterritorial eminent domain power as authority for its position is contrary to the general 
principle set forth in Great Salt Lake Author, v. Island Ranching Co., 421 P.2d 504 (Utah 
1966). In that case, the Supreme Court of Utah relied on Bertagnoli to rule that a statutory 
scheme did not confer eminent domain power by express terms or implication. Id. at 505-6. 
In Island Ranching, the statute in question conferred on the Great Salt Lake Authority no 
general eminent domain power—but provided other specific means for acquisition of 
property on Antelope Island ("donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means 
as deemed necessary"). Id. at 505. The court observed that the legislature expressly failed 
to include as a means of acquisition taking by eminent domain. Id. As such, giving strict 
construction to the statute in question, the Island Ranching court ruled that the 'legislature 
intended a manner of acquisition of Antelope Island other than eminent domain." Id. 
All of the statutory provisions cited in Provo City's Brief expressly fail to grant the 
city extraterritorial powers of eminent domain. Consequently, because the statutory 
provisions cited by Provo City in its Brief do not expressly confer the power of 
extraterritorial condemnation on the city, Provo City cannot rely on those statutes to support 
its position in this case. 
The trial court, however, held that Article XI, § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution delegated 
extra-territorial condemnation powers, for the purpose of road construction, to Provo City. 
Article XI, § 5(b) grants a municipality eminent domain power "within or without the 
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corporate limits" exclusively for the provision of "local public utilities" and "local public 
services." In contrast, Article XI, § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution limits municipal eminent 
domain power. It reads in pertinent part: "The power to be conferred upon the cities by this 
section shall include the following... (c) to make local public improvements and to acquire 
by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits..." (Emphasis added). 
As such, Provo City only has the extraterritorial power to condemn Spring Canyon's 
property if the construction of a road is determined to be a public utility, as opposed to 
merely a local improvement. The trial court's ruling, in expanding the definition of the term 
"public utility" to include a road, eviscerated the meaning of Article XI, § 5(c), effectively 
merging it into § 5(b) by allowing Provo City to condemn property located outside its 
municipal boundaries to construct a local public improvement, namely a road. 
In an effort to support the trial court's conclusion, and to demonstrate that the road 
in question represents a public utility, Provo City relies on the definitions of "utility" and 
"public utility" located in UTAH CODE ANN. §72-6-116(l)(b) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-
1 (15)(a), respectively. See Br. of Appellee, at 16-17. It is significant to note, however, that 
while Provo City attempts to fit a road in these definitions, neither statutory provisions lists 
roads as a public utility. Additionally, while "local streets and roads, curb, gutter, and 
sidewalk maintenance are listed as "municipal services in UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-36-2 
(22)(empahsis added), no Utah statute defines road construction as a public utility. 
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Under generally accepted definitions, a local public improvement represents an 
improvement which, although it may incidently benefit the public at large, is made primarily 
for the accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants of a particular locality. See 8 
McQuillin on Corporations § 2027 (1921). Additionally, even though a proposed 
improvement might directly benefit a problem of statewide concern, it will not be held to be 
a general improvement if its primary purpose is to solve or alleviate the problem of a 
particular locality. See In re Village of Hinsdale. Cook & Du Page Counties v. Lowenstine. 
319 N.E. 2d 83 (111. App. 1974); McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 38.11 (3rd Ed.) Conversely, a 
public utility provides a necessary service to the public, such as telephones, electricity, and 
water. See Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1544 (7th Ed. 1999). Therefore, to assess whether the 
proposed road is a local improvement or a public utility or service, the Court must consider 
the character of the improvement, its situation, its surrounding conditions, and whether its 
primary purpose is to create a local or general benefit. See McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 38.11 
(3rd Ed.) 
Provo City is attempting to use its eminent domain power for the purpose of 
constructing a road for the accommodation and convenience of a growing population. 
According to the resolution passed by the Provo Municipal Council, the purpose of the 
proposed connector road is to ease traffic congestion created by the Riverwoods shopping 
center and other businesses located on the west side of University Avenue. (See Rec. Pg. 112 
& 2). According to the resolution, the proposed road will ease traffic congestion only in that 
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area. (See Rec. Pg. 112 & 2) The proposed road does not feed in to Interstate 15 or any other 
main arteries of the city. The proposed road would merely provide residents of the 
northeastern quadrant of the city more convenience and accommodation in accessing the 
businesses located near the Riverwoods Shopping Center. 
Although the road in question may help to ease a traffic problem of citywide and even 
statewide concern, its primary purpose is to alleviate the problem of a particular locality. As 
such, the primary benefit is local in nature, the convenience and accommodation of those in 
the northeast quadrant of the city (Rec. Pg. 335). Therefore, the road represents a local 
public improvement. Consequently, Article XI §5(c) should apply to limit Provo City's 
eminent domain power to "property within its corporate limits." As a result, the trial court's 
interpretation of Article XI § 5(b), as applied to allow Provo City extra-territorial powers of 
condemnation in this action, renders Article XI § 5(c) of the Utah Constitution superfluous 
and unnecessary. 
Under Utah law, it is clear that: 
a municipal corporation cannot condemn land within the state but outside its 
corporate limits unless the power has been delegated by the legislature. When 
the power of eminent domain is given by statute, it is a well settled principle 
of law amply supported by cases from many jurisdictions in this country, that 
the extent to which the power may be exercised is limited to the express terms 
and clear implications of the statute. (Emphasis added). 
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626,627 (Utah 1950) (citations and punctuation omitted). The 
Bertagnoli court drew a distinction similar to that drawn by sections 5(b) and 5(c) of Article 
XI of the Utah Constitution. The Bertagnoli court determined that cases from other 
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jurisdictions finding extra-territorial eminent domain power had dealt with express terms or 
clear implications. Id. The assertion of extra-territorial eminent domain power in those cases 
was limited to public utilities, such as "a culinary water system, a sewer system, or a hydro-
electric power plant/' Id. The school board, however, was attempting to condemn land 
outside its corporate limits for the purpose of erecting a public school building. Id. at 627-
28. The court held that the school building, while certainly a public benefit that was deemed 
necessary by the school district, did not constitute a public utility. Therefore, the court held 
that the school board did not have extra-territorial eminent domain power in that case. Id. 
at 630. 
The similarity between the issue in Bertagnoli and the case now at bar is significant. 
In Bertagnoli, the school district was attempting to accommodate the needs of a growing 
population. It was not disputed that it would provide a benefit to the public and would 
accommodate the growth in population. The Bertagnoli court held that the constitutional 
provision limited condemnation to the city boundaries. 
Similarly, while the proposed road may confer a public benefit that Provo City has 
deemed necessary, it does not mean that the proposed road is a public utility. Because the 
proposed road would be constructed primarily for the accommodation and convenience of 
the inhabitants of a particular locality, it represents a local public improvement. As such, 
Article XI § 5(c) limits the application of § 5(b) and precludes Provo City from acquiring the 
Spring Canyon's property through extraterritorial eminent domain. Thus, because no other 
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statutory or constitutional provision grants such authority, Provo City does not have the 
authority to acquire the property at issue in this matter through eminent domain. 
n. PROVO CITY DOES NOT HAVE IMPLIED EXTRATERRITORIAL 
CONDEMNATION POWERS TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR A 
PUBLIC ROAD. 
The mere fact that Article XI § 5(b) expressly grants Provo City extraterritorial 
powers of condemnation to provide public utilities does not imply that Provo City has 
extraterritorial condemnation powers to construct a road. As a general rule: 
[A] municipal corporation possess and can exercise the following powers and 
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or 
fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted: third, those 
essential to the accomplishment, of the declared objects and purposes of the 
corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, 
or substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the court 
against the corporation, and the power is denied. Nance, 150 P.2d at 774 
(citing Dillon on Mun. Corps. § 237 (5th Ed.); see also Am. Petroleum Co. v. 
Qgden City. 62 P.2d 557, 558, 90 Utah 465 (1936). 
Black's defines "necessary implication" as "[a]n implication so strong in its 
probability that anything to the contrary would be unreasonable." Black's Law Dictionary. 
p.757 (7th Ed. 1999). Accordingly, to imply a power, that power must be indispensable as 
distinguished from merely useful or convenient. See 2A McQuillin on Mun. Corps. § 10.12 
(3rd Ed.) (1996). Thus, "the necessary implication of the municipal power must be so clear 
and strong as to render highly improbable that the legislature could have entertained an 
intention contrary to that implication." Id. In other words, "there is no implied power . . . 
unless otherwise the express power would be rendered nugatory." Id. As a result: 
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It is a recognized rule of construction that one power is implied in the grant of 
another when the latter cannot be exercised or carried into effect without the 
exercise of the implied power, since anything within the manifest intention of 
the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the 
letter. 
This is of greater significance since the provisions being applied are constitutional 
provisions not just pronouncements of the legislature. 11 McQuillin on Mun. Corps. §32.16 
(3rd Ed.) (2000). Consequently, there can be no implied powers independent of express 
powers. See 2A McOuillin on Mun. Corps. § 10.12 (3rd Ed.) (1996). 
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Fuller. 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1979) shows how the doctrine of 
necessary implication functions. In Fuller, statutory language authorized "[t]he construction 
and maintenance of roadside rest areas." 603 P.2d at 816. The court reasoned that the term 
"maintenance" would logically include waste disposal necessitated by the services offered 
at the rest area. Id. The court held that the power to construct and maintain a sewage lagoon 
was implied by the express statutory grant of power to maintain and construct roadside rest 
areas. Id. Consequently, because the construction of a sewage lagoon was essential to the 
maintenance of the rest area, the power to do so was necessarily implied by the express 
statutory grant of power. Id. The express power to construct and maintain roadside areas 
could not be carried out without the means to provide water disposal. 
Conversely, Provo City does not have any express grant of power from which 
extraterritorial powers of condemnation to construct a road can be implied. Provo City 
claims "[t]he city has indisputable power to condemn extraterritorially for public utilities 
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(water and sewer lines), and therefore it must, under the rationale of Fuller by that same 
"necessary implication" possess the power to condemn for the road in which to locate, 
access, and maintain those public utilities." Br. of Appellee, at 24. This assertion defies 
logic, as Provo City is not seeking to condemn Spring Canyon's property in order to construct 
a road that will provide access to a public utility, but rather construct a road that will provide 
the inhabitants of a certain location access to a shopping center. (See Rec. Pg.l 12 & 2). 
In its Brief, Provo City argues that it will place waste and sewer lines under the 
proposed road. See Br. of Appellee, at 15,24. Provo City asserts this argument in an attempt 
to classify its road as a public utility and thus qualify for the express grant of extraterritorial 
condemnation under Article XI § 5(b). This argument is not part of the record and was never 
asserted in the proceedings before the trial court. There is no assertion in the resolution 
passed by the city that it was to install such utilities in the road. The city now asserts it on 
appeal because they cannot demonstrate that a road is a utility. As a result, Provo City has 
not offered any evidence that it will install water or sewer lines under the proposed road. It 
is well settled that an appellate court will not consider issues, arguments, or claims not raised 
in the proceedings below. See Dejavue v. U.S. Energy Corp, 993 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah App. 
1999). Consequently, Provo City cannot present or rely on such argument at this stage of the 
proceedings. 
Additionally, powers can only be implied from an express grant of power. If Provo 
City were seeking to take property by extraterritorial eminent domain to construct a public 
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utility, such as culinary water system, a sewer system, or a hydro-electric power plant, then 
it would have a express grant of power under Article XI § 5(b) of the Utah Constitution. 
Then, if an access road was essential to the construction of this utility, Provo City may have 
the implied power to take property by extraterritorial eminent domain to construct that access 
road. But that is not the issue before the Court. In this case, however, Provo City's primary 
purpose is to construct a road. Thus, Provo City must have some express grant of power to 
acquire the property for the proposed road through extraterritorial eminent domain. 
Provo City does not have an express grant of power to acquire property located 
outside its municipal boundaries by eminent domain for the purposes of road construction. 
The proposed road is a local public improvement because it will be constructed primarily for 
the accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants of a particular locality. As such, 
Article XI § 5(c) prohibits Provo City from acquiring the property by extraterritorial eminent 
domain. Therefore, because Provo City has not shown any express grant of power to support 
extraterritorial eminent domain in this matter, the doctrine of implied powers does not apply. 
Similarly, even if the Court accepts the unjustifiable argument that the installation of 
sewer and water lines under the road represent Provo City's purpose in acquiring Spring 
Canyon's land, an argument not supported by the Resolution passed by the Provo City 
Council, Provo City must still show that the construction of this road is essential to its 
installation of the sewer and water lines. Because no evidence or argument has been 
presented on this issue, Provo City has not met its burden of showing that without the 
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construction of the road the installation of the sewer and water lines would be rendered 
nugatory. Consequently, Provo City cannot use the doctrine of implied powers to justify its 
position. 
III. ALLOWING THE TRIAL COURT'S EXPANSION OF ARTICLE XI § 5(b) 
VASTLY EXPANDS THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER OF 
MUNICIPALITIES AT THE EXPENSE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. 
The generally accepted rule is that "the power to condemn, unless expressly granted, 
must rest upon clear and unmistakable implication." McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 32.16 (3rd 
Ed.). Under the trial court's holding, however, as long as some purported benefit to the 
general community exits, no matter how indirect or attenuated it may be, a municipality can 
use its eminent domain power to take land located outside its corporate boundaries. The 
interpretation of Article XI §§ 5(b) and 5(c) given by the trial court, vastly expands a 
municipality's power to condemn land outside its corporate boundaries. The trial court has 
blurred the line between 'local public improvements" and "public utilities" in such a way as 
to allow municipalities to condemn land outside their corporate boundaries for any reason. 
The consequences of the trial court's ruling are not isolated. If the trial court's ruling 
is affirmed, there is no doubt that most cities in the state will freely condemn land outside 
their corporate boundaries to improve their local infrastructure under the guise of 
constructing a "public utility." Consequently, municipalities will have unbridled power to 
condemn land wherever they want because surely any land acquired by a municipality will 
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indirectly benefit the community at large, and thus classified as a public utility under the trial 
court's interpretation of the term. 
The Constitution of Utah provides that "All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property." 
Ut. Const. Art. 1, § 1. In the context of eminent domain, the Supreme Court of Utah also 
underscored the importance of property rights when it ruled that "[ejvery landowner in this 
country has a right to resist with every legal means available the expropriation of his or her 
land. The right of eminent domain does not require docile passivity on the part of a 
landowner." Utah State Road Com'n v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821, 834 (Utah 1984). Article XI, 
§ 5(c) provides an important legal means by which a landowner can protect his or her 
property rights from encroachment by a municipality. Article XI, § 5(c) only allows a 
municipality to condemn land outside its boundaries for the construction or maintenance of 
essential public utilities. Municipalities are prohibited from condemning land outside their 
boundaries to merely make improvements. 
The trial court has, however, eviscerated the meaning of Article XI, § 5(c), effectively 
merging it into § 5(b) by allowing Provo City to condemn property located outside its 
municipal boundaries to construct a local public improvement. As such, the trial court has 
allowed municipalities to exercise eminent domain power over those not located within its 
boundaries freely and without constraint. Under this rule, a city could use its eminent domain 
15 
power to take land extending tor miles outside its corporate limits as long as that land was 
condemned to provide some "public benefit," no matter how remote or minuscule. 
In order to avoid such chaotic results, this Court should abide by the generally 
accepted rule that the power of a municipality to condemn land located outside its corporate 
boundaries must be expressly granted or must rest upon clear and unmistakable implication." 
McQujUin Mun. Corp. § 32.16 (3rd Ed.). Thus, because the proposed road is a local public 
improvement, Article XI § 5(b) does not give Prov0 City extraterritorial condemnation 
powers in this case and the trial court's order should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Provo City is unable to present any evidence that it possesses extra-territorial eminent 
domain power for the purpose of road construction. A road is not a public utility, but rather 
a local public improvement. Because Provo City has no express grant of power in this case, 
it cannot rely on the doctrine of implied powers. This court should reaffirm its prior 
pronouncement in Bertagnoli that "a municipal corporation cannot condemn land within the 
state but outside its corporate limits." As such, Defendants respectfully request that the 
16 
Court reverse the trial court's ruling and hold that Article XI § 5(c) precludes Provo City 
from acquiring Defendants' land by means of extraterritorial eminent domain. 
DATED and SIGNED this/^JTday of May, 2003. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
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placing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this / > day of May, 2003, 
addressed as follows: 
Mr. David C. Dixon 
Assistant Provo City Attorney 
351 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, UT 84603 
Mr. Harold A. Hintze 
Special Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 173 
Fish Haven, ID 83287 
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ADDENDUM 
In its Brief, Provo City stated that "[b]y open court stipulation of Counsel at the 
hearing on the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the sole issue reserved for appeal was the 
issue of extraterritorial condemnation." While Spring Canyon is unaware of any stipulation, 
it agrees that extraterritorial condemnation is the sole issue in this appeal. 
Additionally, Provo City took exception to several of the descriptive facts included 
in Spring Canyon's Brief. Everything that Provo City objected to in the Brief was part of the 
record and the record was cited to for support. The first two statements objected to by Provo 
City are merely descriptive statements of facts concerning the location of the property. The 
third statement objected to is the use of language from Provo City own Condemnation 
Resolution. This citation is used not to disparage the Resolution, as Provo City claims, but 
rather to support the argument that the road is a local improvement by showing Provo City's 
stated reasons for attempting to condemn the land. Facts four and five that Provo City 
objects to merely illustrate the possible impact that the proposed condemnation will have on 
Spring Canyon's business. Spring Canyon has not relied on any fact or raised any claim or 
argument in its Brief that was not raised before the trial court. 
Provo City' Brief, however, raises several facts that it uses to support an argument not 
found in the record. Consequently, the following facts, findings, or arguments from Provo 
City's Brief are irrelevant and immaterial: 
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1. "The City asserts that a public street in which water and sewer lines will also 
be located are admittedly clearly 'improvements.'" (Br. of Appellee at 11) (The statement 
that water and sewer lines will accompany the proposed road is unsupported by the record. 
It represents an attempt to introduce a new claim that was not raised in the proceedings 
below.) 
2. "Since it is uncontested herein that one usage of the easement sought herein 
is indisputably for the placement of traditional 'public utilities in local use' (water and 
sewer) it is perhaps unnecessary for this Court to determine if a public street, alone, is a 
'public service' or 'public utility' under subsection 5(b) or is a 'public improvement' under 
5(c)." (Br. of Appellee at 15) (Emphasis in original). (That the usage of the easement sought 
will be for the placement of water and sewer was not raised in the trial court. The assertion 
is a completely new claim that cannot be raised at this stage of the proceedings.) 
3. "The Order of Immediate Occupancy entered below finding that the City has 
the 'right to take' the subject easements for construction and maintenance of a public street, 
water and sewer facilities should be affirmed." (Br. of Appellee at 30). (The placement of 
water and sewer facilities is not supported by the record and that holding is not reflected in 
the Order for Immediate Occupancy. It is a misrepresentation of the facts and it is 
immaterial. 
4. Addendum "A" contains a zoning map of Provo City. This map is not part of 
the record and should not be considered as part of this appeal. 
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